In this context, messages evolve from
discussions and focus on practical, detailed and precise alternatives as a way of promoting a reduction in risk-taking behavior. A
key tool in this regard is village-risk mapping,
which can also be fed into the mine-marking
and prioritization process. In addition, as noted in the 2001 Landmine Monitor Report, “as a
result of its community focus, mine awareness/
community-liaison is also well placed to identify mine survivors who have unmet needs. Although community-liaison teams should not
necessarily be expected to have technical expertise in mine-survivor assistance, sometimes amputees are not aware of the existence
of prosthetics clinics, or believe that being fitted with a replacement or even a first artificial
limb will be prohibitively expensive. In such a
case, the simple transfer of information—and
possibly the provision of transport—can suffice to make a world of difference to an individual and his/her family.”6
Similarly, a broader community-liaison
approach can include rapid-response “spot”
explosive-ordnance-disposal activities. In
Cambodia, the focus of MRE is now on risk
reduction in the widest sense. The country

modified its traditional information-based approach in favor of one focusing more on undertaking concrete steps to make a particular area
safe. This process is accomplished through improved marking and removal of known and
dangerous ordnance. The approach is aided by
the fact that a team may spend many days in a
village undertaking unexploded ordnance removal, proximity clearance, awareness presentations, discussions and mapping.
In order to better protect children from
landmines and UXO, “child-to-child” training entered the MRE lexicon in 1999, with a
number of organizations incorporating “childto-child” methodology into awareness programs, most notably in Kosovo. In a context
where teaching is typically authoritarian and
learning is rote, child-to-child techniques can
be liberating and empowering both for the
children and their teachers. Some anecdotal
evidence suggests that this approach also results in information sharing in the home and,
as such, it can be used to educate parents via
their children.7
Similar to demining, MRE should also
demonstrate a clear and concise approach to
prioritizing its activities. It is one thing to tar-
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get thousands of people assumed to be “at some
risk” through a well-designed communitybased project or provide basic radio messages
to millions, but it is quite another to make sure
that all those who are truly the most at-risk are
targeted, first with the appropriate messages
and second, in a timely and systematic manner. Ongoing national surveillance systems
on mine/ERW incidents, combined with survey tools on knowledge and practices, provide
key data that can help identify the most at-risk
groups of people in the most at-risk communities, adjust prevention messages and find the
best channels to reach them.
Continued Necessity
MRE continues to evolve in tandem with
the changing nature of the mine/ERW threat
and communities’ needs to practice effective
risk reduction. As such, MRE is no more about
simple awareness-raising than demining is
about just digging up landmines. MRE continues to be an integral part of our efforts and responsibility to meet the needs of those living in
mine-/ERW-affected environments and to help
fulfill their universal right to life.
See Endnotes, Page 112
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The Challenges of IED Awareness and
MRE in Afghanistan
Improvised explosive devices have become a significant threat to the people of Afghanistan and have
surpassed the threat posed by other types of explosive remnants of war. In order to combat these dangers,
the United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan has worked closely with other groups to develop an
IED-awareness booklet that supports current mine-risk education efforts.
by Mathias Hagstrøm [ Roskilde University ]

T

he people of Afghanistan have seen more than their share of war
and conflict. Explosive remnants of war and their consequences have been a part of Afghans’ lives since the 1980s. Mine-risk
education has therefore been important in communicating the dangers
of ERW. Children have always been among the most vulnerable to these
dangers, and MRE campaigns are therefore usually aimed at them.1
In the current conflict between the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and insurgents, civilians are again living with the
consequences of war. With the rise of insurgent activity, IEDs have become increasingly common. IED casualties have risen tremendously
and now surpass the ERW casualties. This development fostered discussions about whether the mine-action community should create riskeducation materials about IEDs, culminating in the development of an
IED-awareness booklet in 2008.
Mine-risk Education in Afghanistan
MRE has gone through tremendous changes since its humble beginnings in the late 1980s. The first mine-awareness programs were developed by Operation Salam, the United Nations’ emergency relief operation
set up in Pakistan in 1988.2 At the time, the Soviet war in Afghanistan was
at its peak, lasting until 1989, when the last Soviet troops withdrew from
Afghanistan and the country became the scene of a vicious civil war.3, 4
During the first years of Operation Salam, it provided MRE mainly
in refugee camps along the Afghan border with the specific intention
of preparing returnees for the dangers of ERW. At the end of the war,
mine-awareness operations began to move into Afghanistan itself. 5
The fundamental methodology established under Operation Salam
still provides the basic framework for MRE. MRE is commonly taught
by mobile teams, with two teachers and a driver. The teacher team normally consists of a man and a woman, giving them the ability to conduct
gender-segregated classes.6, 7, 8
In general, MRE programs consist of lectures with the use of posters,
silk screens, activity cards, brochures, booklets and pamphlets as education materials commonly termed “training aids.” The teacher introduces
the students to ERW using posters.9, 10 The IED-awareness booklet is intended to supplement existing program materials.
To ensure that the guidelines and teaching systems set by the United
Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan are followed, UNMACA’s
quality-assurance teams perform routine checks of the MRE sessions. This
system is established to provide feedback to the MRE teachers and nongovernmental organizations running MRE programs in particular regions.7
The basic structure of MRE has changed very little over the
years. The teaching system developed around regular MRE
constitutes a teaching ideology that transcends Afghan MRE as a

Children leaving a mine-risk education class held in the village mosque of Qal’eh-ye
Sefid in the southwestern part of the Kabul province.
ALL GRAPHICS COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR

whole and reaches community-based training, as well as mine-risk
education using mass media. The overall MRE messages UNMACA
developed provide the basis for all MRE within the civilian sector
of Afghanistan. The NGOs providing the teaching in the field also
follow the UNMACA guidelines.
From the 1980s until the mid-1990s, materials were very technical,
with detailed descriptions of types and models of ordnance and mines,
and their individual effects. As time went on, it became clear that participants were receiving more information than they could absorb during the relatively short sessions.10 Since then, a series of messages was
developed to simplify the MRE training.
Today there are 10 messages that constitute the core of Afghan
MRE. The last major revision of the messages was made in the winter of 2008, when UNMACA developed materials that introduced
several victim-assistance issues. The 2005 National Disability Survey Handicap International developed has been the foundation
for understanding the importance of developing victim-assistance
awareness within MRE.10, 11, 12
The new materials have been shaped so that the messages fit the
Ministry of Education’s MRE plans and national curricula.14, 15, 16
When the International Security Assistance Forces approached
UNMACA in 2007 about cooperating on the IED-awareness
booklet, the framework for cooperation between UNMACA and
the Ministry of Education was being prepared for the transition.
This meant that ISAF, UNMACA and the Ministry of Education
worked as semi-autonomous teams while developing the content
and design of the IED booklet.17, 18
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Figure 2: This map shows the activity of insurgents in Afghanistan
as of August 2008.

Skepticism between the civilian and the military sectors
was evident from the start. Within UNMACA, as well as the
Ministry of Education, there was concern that a civilianmilitary cooperation could blur the line between military
and humanitarian operations.13, 18

areas of the country. Field staff have raised concerns
about using MRE materials that can be interpreted
as having links with Afghanistan’s government by
displaying such items as logos and pictures of officials
(e.g., military or police personnel). The field staff of
the Afghan NGO Organization of Mine Clearance
and Afghan Rehabilitation are worried that they
risk being killed if such materials are found on them
by insurgents. This concern is also one of the main
objections expressed by field staff about teaching IED
awareness, and it has emphasized the need for caution
in sensitive areas.5
In large parts of Afghanistan, where the
insurgency has a permanent presence, the number of
IED incidents is at its highest, which means that the
areas where IED awareness is most needed are also
the most inaccessible. The number of IED casualties
has greatly surpassed those of ERW since 2006.
This development emphasizes the need for teaching
IED awareness in the area. The IED-awareness
booklet represents the first step in countering this
development and gives the population some tools to deal with the IED threat in their
everyday lives.

IED-awareness Booklet
Prior to creating the IED-awareness booklet, ISAF was engaged in MRE and IEDawareness independently in the field when the military provided training on an ad
hoc basis. The United Nations and NGOs have criticized some of these MRE and IEDawareness initiatives for disrupting the civilian MRE system already in place by not folIED Awareness in MRE
lowing the guidelines UNMACA developed.18, 19
ISAF began developing the booklet in the fall of 2007.
For the development of the IED-awareness booklet, an organizational framework for coBoth the military and civilian sectors saw IED-awareness
operation was established. UNMACA was the primary agent in the practical development
training among the population as an important area that
and design of the booklet, working specifically with ISAF to develop a set of IED-awareness
was underscored by the increasing number of IED incimessages that were compatible and complementary to the current MRE system of messages.
dents and a growing number of casualties in each incident.
The Ministry of Education set up a review board that addressed problems in the design and
In August 2008, the International Council for Security
implementation of the material regarding Afghan cultural sensibilities and political issues
and Development estimated there was permanent insurgent
that could become problematic in the everyday use of such a booklet.20, 21
It soon became clear that a new framework was needed to sufficiently address problems concerning IEDs. Consequently, the
Ministry of Education, UNMACA and ISAF
developed a three-pronged IED-awareness
message that included the recognition of
IEDs and dangerous areas, the detection
of IEDs, and safe behavior. One of the most
important tasks was to help children recognize IEDs, so the booklet constructed a separate message specifically for children.22 The
booklet also warns of odd and out-of-place
objects. Out-of-place objects were often
used as booby traps during the Soviet war
in Afghanistan and the civil war, and are
often used by insurgents today.22, 23
In the safe behavior section of the booklet, the last two messages are fundamentalFigure 3: In 2006, IED casualties (red) surpassed those of explosive remnants of war (blue). This development emphaly different and break with the post-conflict
sizes the need for a targeted humanitarian effort to reduce the civilian population’s exposure to the IED risk.
scenario through which MRE messages are
commonly developed. The messages reflect
activity in half of the Afghan provinces, and only six
the dangers of reporting an IED and emphasize that Afghanistan is a conflict zone. The
provinces were characterized by low insurgent activity
need to inform more than one adult reflects the fact that there may be local support for the
(see map above). The strong insurgent presence has made
insurgency. “Don’t be afraid to mention something that seems odd” is an attempt to ensure
it difficult for the mine-action community to work in many
that countermeasures against the IED are taken.
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on 27 February 2008, when he said,
“The Taliban was able to control, with
the population in the area, about 10–
11 percent of the country. The federal
government, on the other hand, had
about 30–31 percent, and the rest was
local control.”25
As mine action has come under
the jurisdiction of the Afghan state
through the Ministry of Education,
the problems of the government’s
regional control have also impacted
UNMACA. It challenges the mineaction community’s ability to
work both in and outside of statecontrolled territory. The development
of sustainable MRE that can succeed
in all areas of Afghanistan is therefore
seriously challenged by the current
institutional framework of MRE.
The Challenge Continues
Afghanistan today is at the forefront of MRE development, dealing
with tremendous challenges relating to
the security of the Afghan people, as well as the
mine-awareness community itself. There are
tremendous problems surrounding the introduction of IED awareness in MRE. These are
challenges that cannot solely be solved in the
planning stage but need to be addressed when
performing IED awareness in the field. Thus,
there is a need for feedback organs that go beyond regular quality assurance, ones that are
able to evaluate not only the immediate effect
of IED-awareness training but also its wider
impact on the mine-action community and its
ability to work effectively.
The statistics clearly show a humanitarian
need for addressing the IED issue. How to deal
with the IED problem raises many of the core
issues humanitarian agents find themselves
facing when working in conflict zones. The
mine-action community’s neutrality is challenged when it develops MRE materials in cooperation with the state and government. The
community also needs to negotiate with other
non-state actors to gain access to areas outside
state control to protect the citizens there. 26
Including IED awareness in the national
MRE program in Afghanistan is in many
ways the responsible choice by the Ministry of
Education, UNMACA and ISAF to deal with
the actual problems facing human security in
Afghanistan; however, it does open a Pandora’s
box of new challenges that need to be addressed.
The consequences of the choices made during
the development of the IED-awareness booklet
have yet to be seen and examined. The choice
of including police and military personnel
in the illustrations could conceivably pose a
security risk to the field staff and the people

Figure 4: IED Awareness Booklet. The use of illustrations of military and police was heatedly discussed during the development
process in relation to the security of MRE personnel and locals.

Implementation in a Conflict Environment
It is impossible to measure how much
danger a child puts himself and other
family members in by reporting an IED,
but it constitutes a serious dilemma that the
reporting of an IED might trigger a military
response. This reality makes it difficult for
the mine-action organization to be a purely
neutral humanitarian agent. The direct
cooperation between ISAF, UNMACA and
the Ministry of Education, along with the
transfer of jurisdiction over the MRE field
to the Ministry of Education, underlines that
MRE in Afghanistan has indeed become a part
of the ongoing state-building project (i.e.,
construction of a functioning state).
The state-building project that began at the
Bonn conference in 200124 and the following
support of the sitting government has been a
process of strong U.N. engagement, but semiautonomous agents such as UNMACA have
been able to function relatively unaffected by
focusing on the demining and MRE tasks at
hand. With the transfer of authority over the
MRE field, UNMACA risks being politicized
by different actors in the Afghan conflict.
UNMACA and the affiliated NGOs are caught
between an institutional post-conflict view
of the field of mine action and the conflict
situation they are faced with on the ground.
The map shown on the previous page
emphasizes just how widespread insurgent
activity is. The Afghan state is weakened
furthermore by a lack of control over its
own territory. Then-U.S. Director of National
Intelligence Michael McConnell addressed
these issues in his speech to the U.S. Congress

they are trying to reach, as there is a danger
of blurring the line between the military and
humanitarian sector. This challenge, combined
with the transfer of jurisdiction of MRE to the
Afghan state, could pose a significant obstacle
to the ability of MRE campaigns to reach their
audience, especially outside state-controlled
territory. A well-functioning institutional
framework that is able to work in Afghanistan
as a whole is therefore vital to the success of
the IED-awareness campaign.
The development of the IED-awareness
booklet has meant a much-needed transfer
of knowledge from the military to the civilian sector in dealing with IEDs. This cooperation and the commitment to IED awareness
need to go beyond the initial work of the IED
booklet. In order to properly address the IED
threat, comprehensive research and field testing are needed so risk-education materials can
address the new challenges that face human
security in Afghanistan.
See Endnotes, Page 112
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